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Security at the Paris Olympic Games – Report

The Dean of the University of Applied Sciences in Security and Safety, Dr. Luka Leško, DBA, a former top athlete himself, earned his PhD on the topic of security at the Summer Olympic Games. He visited Paris during the recently concluded Olympic Games, and we are sharing his condensed report on the security of this grand event.

The Dean of the VSS in front of the Main Olympic Police Headquarters in Paris

The Olympic Games (OG) represent the most complex security operation for any mass event worldwide. The Paris Games were the most demanding security operation in France’s recent history, with the largest military camp established since World War II for this purpose. As risks continue to evolve, each subsequent OG becomes more complex, and since September 11, 2001, security budgets are no longer measured in millions but in billions of USD (e.g., $250 million in Sydney in 2000, compared to $6.5 billion in Beijing in 2008). Sydney engaged 5,000 police officers, 3,500 soldiers, and 7,000 private security personnel, while Beijing, just eight years later, had 92,500 people directly involved in security, plus an additional 100,000 regular soldiers and 290,000 civilian security volunteers. Depending on the perspective, the Paris OG security budget could also be counted in billions of euros, if not for Paris and France’s rich tradition of hosting large sports events and their impressive urban security infrastructure. The total cost of engaged security personnel amounted to approximately 320 million euros.

Risk assessment is a crucial starting point in security preparation (identifying potential threats, assessing potential damage from such threats, evaluating the likelihood of each specific threat, and estimating the costs and activities necessary to mitigate those threats). Based on this assessment, a security strategy is developed, including individual action plans for each separate sports venue and all associated locations. Mass gatherings, known match schedules, a high concentration of emotions, entertainment, carefree attitudes, and the potential for publicity at low cost make these events attractive soft targets for terrorist attacks. As a result, terrorism ranks highest on the list of security risks, along with cyberterrorism and other types of cyberattacks, which have made CERT an essential part of the security preparation for such events since the London Games in 2012. Other potential threats, besides infrastructural risks like the collapse of sports and auxiliary facilities, include crime and violence, sabotage, natural disasters, epidemics, pandemics, and anything else that could threaten the safety and health of those present or disrupt the smooth running of the competition. Organizers face the greatest challenge in ensuring comprehensive security in a way that is as unobtrusive as possible, so that the collective experience of participation remains as enjoyable as possible.

The International Olympic Committee mandates that security is the sole responsibility of the host city. In Paris, the French Minister of the Interior had central command over the Olympic security forces, while the Paris Police Prefect oversaw security and protection in a broader operational sense, with the establishment of an Olympic Intelligence Center. However, the conceptual evolution of security shows a shift from a domestic approach to international multi-agency cooperation. Following the establishment of the Olympic Advisory Group of seven countries for advisory purposes at the Athens 2004 Games, international cooperation has become indispensable. Due to events in Gaza and Ukraine, threats from the Islamic State group, and France’s history of domestic Islamist incidents, there were concerns about France’s ability to provide adequate security for the Olympics. By early July, two attempted terrorist attacks on the Games had been thwarted, and manuals were discovered with instructions on modifying commercial drones to carry explosive devices, intending to carry out attacks during the Olympics. In the lead-up to the event, special police monitoring was also conducted on homeless individuals, sex workers, and migrants.

Paris hosted around 10,000 athletes, their delegation members, approximately 15 million tourists and fans, numerous journalists, and other stakeholders. To ensure security, around 75,000 police officers, soldiers, and private security personnel were engaged, including 2,000 foreign security officers. To start, the opening ceremony itself marked a significant precedent, as it was the first time it was held outside a stadium. With approximately 300,000 people lining the six-kilometer stretch along the Seine River, security preparations were drastically complicated. Just days before the ceremony, a series of coordinated attacks on French railways were recorded. Additionally, about one million people followed the course of the men’s and women’s road cycling races, which required heightened security measures. In another incident, a man wearing a “Free Palestine” shirt attempted to run onto the track before the men’s 100-meter sprint final, causing a slight delay in the race. Ensuring the health of participants is certainly an integral part of Olympic security, and the hospitalization of several participants after the triathlon in the Seine’s questionable water quality points to insufficient preparation or a determination to hold the race in that river, despite the €1.5 billion spent on its purification. Cyberattacks also posed a threat. For context, around 450 million cyberattacks of various types were recorded during the Tokyo 2021 Olympics (including attacks on broadcasting systems, ransomware, DDoS attacks on service availability, which can be used to distract from other attacks, etc.). The Paris organizers also recorded numerous attacks, 140 of which were serious, but fortunately, none resulted in significant consequences. Despite controversies regarding restrictions on human rights and freedoms, surveillance remains an unavoidable method of maintaining Olympic security. Along with numerous traditional CCTV cameras and drones, a surveillance system based on artificial intelligence was tested, capable of detecting, for example, weapon possession, unusual crowd movements, or the presence of a person or vehicle in restricted/sensitive areas. This system is expected to become a permanent security mechanism for the French capital by 2025. Additionally, numerous walls and metal fences were erected during the Olympics to guide and direct traffic.

In conclusion, despite some incidents, the overall impression is that the Paris Olympic Games organizers provided a very high level of participant safety and managed to balance comprehensive security with minimal visibility of security forces on the city’s streets. However, with the Paralympic Games upcoming and terrorist risks still high, there is no room for underestimating or reducing vigilance. While the world was watching the Paris Olympics, continuous preventive measures have already been underway in Los Angeles for the 2028 Games. This is primarily due to geolocation factors and the specifics of the seismic zone, as well as the regular preparatory activities of the local intelligence agencies directly involved in preparing for the Olympic Games.